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Official Diary

Wednesday, 3 September 1952

25X1A5a1 1. At the Deputies' meeting, which the DCI did not attend,
25X1A6a reported on the arrangements which we had made for debriefing [REDACTED] in [REDACTED]

25X1A9a 2. Suggested as a PW measure that PP get out a brochure defining the terms used by the Russians in their various propaganda handouts along the lines suggested by Kennan for a reply to the recent Russian note. [REDACTED] undertook to look into this question, and Mr. Hedden suggested that after it had been worked out a final brochure should be prepared by professionals.

3. Also reported at the Deputies' meeting that we were setting up a "Who's Who" on the Asian Peace Conference in FI. 25X1A9a [REDACTED]

4. Reported to Mr. Dulles on the NSC Senior Staff meeting on NSC 135, specifically respecting the JCS comments and the NSRB comments. We inferred that the latter may have been affected by the [REDACTED] paper. 25X1A9a

25X1A9a 5. Chatted with [REDACTED], who had been offered to the Intelligence Offices on a rotation basis (two years) by [REDACTED] 25X1A9a
25X1A9a [REDACTED] is highly qualified with respect to Czechoslovakia and well qualified with respect to Eastern Europe, in general. He would be particularly interested in working in O/NE, but would also be interested in other Offices. I suggested that he talk both with Sherman Kent and with Mr. Sheldon.

25X1A9a 6. Chatted with [REDACTED] on certain matters coming before USCIB.

7. Attended IADs' meeting.

8. Reviewed with Dr. Andrews his plans respecting the work of the Supergrade Board. His point was that the recent ceiling ruling and the activities of the Board to date are based upon an inadequate study of the actual supergrade position in the various agencies and departments of the Government, and he indicated the need for substantial work being done on the facts. I fully concurred, and also said that he should not lose sight of the allocation of such supergrades as between the Intelligence and Operational Offices. Specifically, it seemed to me that there was an undue allocation of such grades to OPC type operations, which, over the long term, are not basic CIA functions. Dr. Andrews proposed that the facts, when ascertained, be made freely available to the respective ADs, and I concurred.

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This document is part of an integrated
subjected to individual systematic review.

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25X1A9a 9. Chatted again with [redacted] 25X1A9a
received a large volume of reports for dissemination to the Intelligence
25X1A9a Offices. [redacted] informed me that he had cleared this in advance with Mr.
25X1A9a [redacted]

25X1A9a 10. [redacted] 25X1A9a
25X1A2g which I shall refer to as [redacted] I later confirmed with the
Director that this series had his approval and thereafter requested [redacted] 25X1A9a
25X1A9a to prepare such a series. [redacted] is the only person other than 25X1A9a
25X1A9a the DCI, D/DCI and [redacted] who is informed as to the nature of this series.

25X1A6c 25X1A9a
11. Spoke with Dr. Kent on [redacted] from [redacted] 25X1A9a
proposed Anglo-French-US conference on the Soviet threat to NATO. Dr. Kent
and I agreed as to the line to be taken and I undertook to draft a reply.

12. Commented to Dr. Kent with respect to the North African
estimate, stating that I was surprised that no mention was made to the U.S.
labor support to the various Nationalist movements. Also queried whether
the estimate fully took into account the possibility of small-scale riots
in Morocco during the fall. Dr. Kent took this point under consideration.

13. Col. Porter phoned me respecting the Joint Staff reaction
to the first two conclusions of NIE 64. In those paragraphs the Russians
had been given the capability of taking most of Europe, Asia, and the
Middle East, but not simultaneously. The Joint Staff thought that this
was most "plus" and also felt that the operations could be conducted
simultaneously. I expressed some surprise at this, in view of the fact
that last year, during the preparation of NSC 114, after an NIE had given
the Soviets the capability of taking all of Europe, the JCS had insisted
on revising NSC 114 to indicate that certain strategically-important
positions could be held. Their present attitude indicated either that they
were changing their position or that we were slipping vis-a-vis the Soviets.
Col. Porter was not, apparently, familiar with this background and undertook
to look into it. I later informed [redacted] of O/NE of these facts and 25X1A9a
requested him to look into the history of NSC 114. Subsequently, I confirmed
with Mr. Lay my recollection of the facts.

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